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FOREIGN AFFAIRS ORIGINALISM IN YOUNGSTOWN’S SHADOW 
STEPHEN I. VLADECK* 
I 
It is always a daunting task to write a response devoted entirely to an 
individual article.  It is that much heavier a burden when the article is as 
thoughtful, careful, and, in the end, self-reflective as Professor Wuerth’s 
contribution to this Symposium.1 
The central thesis of Professor Wuerth’s article, as I take it, is that 
“originalism,” under a number of different conceptualizations, is an “awkward 
fit” in the field of foreign affairs.  In one sense, as Professor Wuerth suggests, 
originalism fails to answer many of the central questions of foreign affairs 
scholarship.2  In another sense, certain foreign affairs questions may, in her 
words, “undermine the positive case for originalism.”3  Either way, Professor 
Wuerth concludes, originalists should pay more attention to foreign affairs, and 
foreign affairs scholars should pay more attention to the competing 
methodologies of contemporary constitutional interpretation.4  There is always 
more, it seems, for us to do—and that is hardly a sentiment with which I can 
take serious issue, even if it encourages lawyers (or, even worse, law 
 
* Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law.  This response was 
prepared in conjunction with the Saint Louis University Law Journal’s March 2008 symposium 
on “The Use and Misuse of History in U.S. Foreign Relations Law,” for my participation in 
which I owe thanks to David Sloss.  Thanks also to Christy Abbott, Thomas Harvey, Taylor 
Matthews, and the rest of the Saint Louis University Law Journal staff for their skilled editing 
and, as importantly, their patience. 
  By way of disclosure, I should note that I have played a recurring role on the legal team 
for the petitioner in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  Needless to say, the opinions 
expressed herein are mine alone, and do not in any way represent the position of Hamdan or his 
counsel. 
 1. Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 5 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 6–7, 27. 
 3. Id. at 8. 
 4. Id. at 7–8. 
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professors) to play historians, a role to which we are not particularly well-
suited.5 
Rather than take up Professor Wuerth’s thesis on its terms, in this short 
response, I want to focus on foreign affairs originalism and the courts, 
notwithstanding Professor Wuerth’s quite accurate observation that a good deal 
of constitutional interpretation vis-à-vis foreign affairs takes place outside the 
courtroom.6  To be sure, my interest in this particular topic is partly selfish—
my own research and writing tends to focus more on the courts and on 
constitutional doctrine than it does on questions of theory or interpretive 
method. 
But it also cannot be gainsaid that one of the most powerful places in 
which questions about the scope of the President’s “foreign affairs” powers 
arise is in lawsuits seeking to resolve conflicts between the President’s claim 
of authority on the one hand, and the power of some other actor, be it Congress 
or the states, on the other.  If ever there are to be definitive answers concerning 
how the Constitution allocates authority concerning foreign affairs, the courts 
will, presumably, have at least some significant role to play in providing them.  
In that instance, the question I want to ask (and hopefully answer) in the pages 
that follow is whether Professor Wuerth’s careful analysis might actually make 
a difference.  Put another way, is there a there, there? 
I suspect that one could easily take from Professor Wuerth’s article the 
sentiment that originalism is, ultimately, of exceedingly little help to 
contemporary courts in resolving serious and difficult foreign affairs questions, 
especially in the context of conflicts between the Legislative and Executive 
Branches.  But my thesis is that the real culprit behind this difficulty is neither 
originalism as an interpretive method nor foreign affairs as a body of 
constitutional law. 
Rather, the reason why the case for foreign affairs originalism may 
ultimately be so unconvincing is the movement toward functionalism as a 
means of resolving separation-of-powers conflicts, particularly in cases 
implicating foreign affairs.  Thus, whatever may be said about the suitability or 
theoretical utility of originalism generally, or in the field of foreign affairs 
specifically, it is hard to square any case for foreign affairs originalism with 
the methodological framework at the heart of the Supreme Court’s 
contemporary separation-of-powers jurisprudence. 
 
 5. For the classic critique of “law-office history,” see Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: 
An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119.  See also Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in 
Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). 
 6. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 6. 
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That analytical framework, of course, finds its origins in Justice Jackson’s 
concurring opinion in Youngstown,7 and his famous trifurcated taxonomical 
approach to resolving separation-of-powers conflicts.8  Thus, I begin in Part II 
with the competing approaches to the legal issue in Youngstown, and the extent 
to which originalism did—and did not—factor into the analysis of the six 
Justices in the majority, especially that of Justice Jackson in his celebrated 
concurrence. 
As Part II explains (and as others have previously noted), there is an 
inherent incongruity between Jackson’s separation-of-powers functionalism 
and foreign affairs originalism.  Indeed, this incongruity does not just bear out 
Professor Flaherty’s observation that Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown is 
“among the most anti-originalist opinions in the modern canon.”9  Rather, it 
demonstrates how, in Youngstown’s shadow, there is exceedingly little room 
for foreign affairs originalism in any form.10 
In Part III, I turn to a pair of recent (and significant) Supreme Court 
decisions invoking Jackson’s analysis—Hamdan11 and Medellin.12  As I’ve 
suggested previously, at least in regard to Hamdan, there are elements of the 
Court’s analysis that suggest a step back from the analytical looseness of 
Jackson’s framework.13  Read alongside Professor Wuerth’s article, perhaps 
these cases further suggest that there is a future for foreign affairs originalism, 
and one that might provide a sounder platform from which to reconceptualize 
the fundamental separation-of-powers problem at the heart of Youngstown. 
II 
Youngstown, of course, was a mess of a case.14  The six Justices in the 
majority—Black, Burton, Clark, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson—each 
offered their own opinion explaining why President Truman’s extra-legislative 
 
 7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 8. Id. at 635–38. 
 9. Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 172 (2004). 
 10. To be clear, my goal is not to critique functionalism in general, or Jacksonian 
functionalism in particular.  Rather, I mean only to demonstrate how Justice Jackson’s 
Youngstown framework is starkly anti-originalist, and how, as a result, the two interpretive 
approaches cannot coexist. 
 11. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 12. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 13. Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers 
After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 960–61 (2007). 
 14. For what remains one of the best overall treatments of the decision, see MAEVA 
MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
(1977). 
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seizure of the steel mills was unconstitutional.15  Justice Black delivered the 
opinion of the Court, offering a rationale that is usually described as 
“formalistic”16—relying on the conclusion that the Constitution confers no 
legislative power upon the Executive, and that Truman was “legislating” by 
seizing the steel mills.17  Justice Douglas echoed Black’s majority opinion, 
concluding that “[w]e could not sanction the seizures and condemnations of the 
steel plants in this case without reading Article II as giving the President not 
only the power to execute the laws but to make some.”18 
To similar (but perhaps not quite as stark) effect, Justices Burton and Clark 
focused on the significance of congressional action in displacing a power that 
the President might otherwise possess.  Justice Burton thus emphasized 
Congress’s omission of such seizure authority in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act,19 
concluding that “[t]he controlling fact here is that Congress, within its 
constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for the President specific 
procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in meeting the present type of 
emergency.”20 
Justice Clark similarly invoked the Taft-Hartley Act, along with the 
Defense Production Act of 195021 and the Selective Service Act of 1948,22 as 
providing procedures for the resolution of labor disputes such as that which 
prompted Truman’s seizure.  In his words, “neither the Defense Production Act 
nor Taft-Hartley authorized the seizure challenged here, and the Government 
made no effort to comply with the procedures established by the Selective 
Service Act of 1948, a statute which expressly authorizes seizures when 
producers fail to supply necessary defense matériel.”23 
The two remaining Justices in the majority, Frankfurter and Jackson, were 
less convinced that the case could be resolved simply on the ground that 
Truman’s actions were wanting for congressional authorization.  For 
Frankfurter, the issue was one of historical practice.  After extensively 
summarizing prior congressional actions, Frankfurter analyzed the significance 
of the omission of seizure authority in Taft-Hartley by reference to precedent: 
 
 15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 16. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 
408, 442 & n.168 (2007). 
 17. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–89. 
 18. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 19. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 20. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring). 
 21. Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (codified as amended 
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061–2171 (2000)). 
 22. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604 (codified as amended at 
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–471a (2000)). 
 23. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 665–66 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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In formulating legislation for dealing with industrial conflicts, Congress could 
not more clearly and emphatically have withheld authority than it did in 1947.  
Perhaps as much so as is true of any piece of modern legislation, Congress 
acted with full consciousness of what it was doing and in the light of much 
recent history.  Previous seizure legislation had subjected the powers granted 
to the President to restrictions of varying degrees of stringency.  Instead of 
giving him even limited powers, Congress in 1947 deemed it wise to require 
the President, upon failure of attempts to reach a voluntary settlement, to report 
to Congress if he deemed the power of seizure a needed shot for his locker.  
The President could not ignore the specific limitations of prior seizure statutes. 
No more could he act in disregard of the limitation put upon seizure by the 
1947 Act.24 
In other words, in Frankfurter’s view, the significance of the Taft-Hartley 
Act’s omission of presidential seizure authority could be judged only by 
reference to prior practice, and not simply by reference to whether the measure 
was within Congress’s constitutional authority in the first place. 
Finally, and most famously, came the concurring opinion of Justice 
Jackson.  That Jackson eschewed any “originalist” view of the separation of 
powers was clear from the outset: 
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they 
foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as 
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.  A 
century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net 
result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on 
each side of any question.  They largely cancel each other.25 
Thus, several pages before Jackson enunciated his tripartite taxonomy for 
resolving separation-of-powers disputes, he affirmatively disclaimed the utility 
of originalism as an aid to his efforts.  Instead, as he put it, “The actual art of 
governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial 
definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or 
even single Articles torn from context.”26  Perhaps as a response to 
Frankfurter’s detailed summary of historical practice, Jackson argued that prior 
precedents did not resolve the issue one way or the other.  Rather, “[w]e may 
well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in 
which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by 
distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity.”27 
 
 24. Id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 25. Id. at 634–35 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Jackson appended a footnote to the same 
passage, suggesting with more than a hint of sarcasm that “[a] Hamilton may be matched against 
a Madison.  Professor Taft is counterbalanced by Theodore Roosevelt.  It even seems that 
President Taft cancels out Professor Taft.”  Id. at 635 n.1 (citations omitted). 
 26. Id. at 635. 
 27. Id. 
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Jackson then introduced his three groupings of “practical situations”: (1) 
where the President acts with congressional authorization; (2) where “the 
President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority”; 
or (3) where the President acts in the face of either the expressed or implied 
will of Congress.28  In the first category, “[i]f his act is held 
unconstitutional . . . it usually means that the Federal Government as an 
undivided whole lacks power.”29  In the second category, 
[T]here is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.  Therefore, congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical 
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility.  In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law.30 
Finally, in category three, where the President’s power “is at its lowest ebb,” 
Jackson’s opinion suggested that “[c]ourts can sustain exclusive Presidential 
control . . . only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”31 
What is ironic about Jackson’s opinion, of course, is that it solves 
practically nothing.  Even under Jackson’s trifurcation, the President can lose 
in category one, he can win in category three, and one is left to wonder just 
what category two means by “contemporary imponderables.”  Indeed, and 
perhaps most importantly, Jackson’s opinion does little to elucidate those 
circumstances in which Congress can be “disabled” from placing limitations 
on presidential power, opening the door to decades of (seemingly unending) 
academic debate.32 
In rejecting the approach of his concurring brethren, Jackson implicitly 
suggested that there were other considerations at stake, considerations having 
excessively little to do with “original” understanding.  The softness of 
Jackson’s three categories thus seems exceedingly difficult to reconcile with 
clear and categorical answers as to the Constitution’s allocation of foreign 
affairs power. 
As Professor Ramsey has explained, it is not just that the framework seems 
difficult to reconcile with contemporary categorical answers.  Instead, 
“[n]either Jackson nor Frankfurter . . . grappled with how the Constitution’s 
 
 28. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 29. Id. at 636–37. 
 30. Id. at 637. 
 31. Id. at 637–38. 
 32. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
689 (2008); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008). 
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text originally allocated foreign affairs power.  Like much modern scholarship, 
they assumed that the Constitution was incomplete on key foreign affairs 
matters, and that gaps would be filled in other ways . . . .”33  And while that 
assumption would not necessarily be fatal to foreign affairs originalism in the 
abstract, Jackson championed a framework that did not really allow for filling 
the gaps with originalism, whether in the form of original public meaning, 
original legal meaning, or any other iteration thereof. 
Of course, Jackson’s concurrence was just one of six opinions.  But his 
opinion was later effectively adopted by the Supreme Court in Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, where then-Justice Rehnquist described Jackson’s framework 
as “analytically useful.”34  Just last Term, Chief Justice Roberts described it as 
“the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.”35  Thus, 
the methodology adopted by the Supreme Court to resolve separation-of-
powers conflicts, particularly in cases implicating “foreign affairs,” was one 
hostile to originalism in both its conceptualization and its implementation. 
III 
Fast-forward to 2006, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan.36  At 
issue was the legality of military commissions established by President Bush 
pursuant solely to a November 2001 executive order.37  And although the bulk 
of Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion (and Justice Kennedy’s partial 
concurrence) focused on questions of statutory interpretation, the constitutional 
imperative bolstering the statutory analysis unmistakably came from 
Youngstown.  In the critical passage of Justice Stevens’s opinion, for example, 
the Court emphasized why the central question was whether the commissions 
established by President Bush comported with the substantive and procedural 
requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)38—an Act of 
Congress: “Whether or not the President has independent power, absent 
congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not 
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war 
powers, placed on his powers.”39 
What is fascinating about this passage, as I’ve noted previously, is that it 
cites Jackson’s framework from Youngstown even while skipping a critical 
 
 33. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 53 (2007). 
 34. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981). 
 35. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008). 
 36. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 37. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006) 
(notes). 
 38. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006). 
 39. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
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step—Hamdan simply asserts that Congress has constitutionally interposed 
limitations on the President’s powers, even though Jackson suggested that 
there would be circumstances where it might be “disabled” from doing so, and 
even though the Bush Administration had argued that this was one such 
circumstance.40  In the process, Hamdan assumed that the relevant 
constitutional power was conferred upon Congress, without ever getting into 
the trickier business of either identifying the particular legislative authority or 
locating it textually. 
A similarly cursory analysis of Youngstown can be found in last Term’s 
decision in Medellin.41  There, in addition to holding that the International 
Court of Justice’s Avena decision42 was not binding upon U.S. state courts,43 
the Supreme Court also rejected the applicability of a memorandum issued by 
President Bush that purported to command the state courts to comply with the 
ICJ judgment.44 
Specifically, in concluding that the President was without authority to 
order compliance by the state courts, the Medellin majority first explained how 
such power did not derive from U.S. treaty obligations,45 before also rejecting 
the argument that the President’s foreign affairs power entitled him to so 
provide.46  And in analyzing the President’s “foreign affairs” power, the 
majority’s discussion was short and uncompromising: 
The President’s Memorandum is not supported by a “particularly longstanding 
practice” of congressional acquiescence, but rather is what the United States 
itself has described as “unprecedented action.”  Indeed, the Government has 
not identified a single instance in which the President has attempted (or 
Congress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to state courts, 
much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State’s police powers and 
compels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally 
applicable state laws.47 
Taking the absence of prior practice as affirmative evidence to the contrary, the 
Medellin majority thus suggested a categorical preclusion of presidential power 
in the field—at least absent some congressional quiescence. 
 
 40. See Vladeck, supra note 13, at 956–61 (explaining in more detail how Hamdan’s 
analysis is inconsistent with Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence). 
 41. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 42. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
 43. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356–67. 
 44. Id. at 1371–72; Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to 
Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html. 
 45. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368–71. 
 46. Id. at 1371–72. 
 47. Id. at 1372 (citations omitted). 
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My point is not to quibble with the analyses supplied by the Court in either 
Hamdan or Medellin.48  At least on these points, I believe that the Court 
reached the correct result on both occasions.  But leaving my own thinking to 
the side, the larger point here is that both of these opinions invoked Justice 
Jackson’s framework, even while appearing to deviate from it—and in 
Hamdan, substantially at that. 
It is hard to know just what to take away from such a small data set.  Is the 
Court signaling a willingness to restore some degree of categorical formalism 
to its consideration of the President’s foreign affairs powers?  Is it simply 
giving short-shrift to analytical steps that it very much intends to include in the 
analysis?  At best, the answer is unclear.  But the more the Court suggests, 
contrary to Justice Jackson, that some of these disputes do have clear and 
categorical answers, the more I suspect there is room to reinvigorate an 
originalist view of foreign affairs powers.49 
IV 
Suggestions in various opinions to the contrary notwithstanding,50 there is 
nothing necessarily formalistic about separated powers—by which I mean 
there is no constitutional requirement that the branches be hermetically 
sealed.51  As Professor Rebecca Brown explained nearly two decades ago, 
The best evidence that the Framers intended to reject a strict separation of 
powers is that they created a system of checks and balances requiring 
participation by each branch in some functions that may be considered part of 
the power of the others—itself a violation of a pure theory of separated 
powers.  “Checks and balances do not arise from separation theory, but are at 
odds with it.  Checks and balances have to do with corrective invasion of the 
separated powers.”  It is worth remembering that the federalist defense of the 
Constitution’s treatment of governmental structure focused not on the use of 
 
 48. For more on the fate of Jackson’s analysis in Hamdan and Medellin, see Michael J. 
Turner, Comment, Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s Tripartite Taxonomy by 
Hamdan and Medellin, 58 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 49. At least, in those cases where originalism provides answers.  For example, in 
Boumediene v Bush, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), Justice Kennedy concluded that 
Founding-era sources were simply unclear as to whether non-citizens outside the United States 
would be protected by the writ of habeas corpus.  See id. at 2248–51. 
 50. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that proper respect for the separation of powers requires recognizing that Article II’s 
Vesting Clause “does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power”). 
 51. But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“Although not ‘hermetically’ sealed 
from one another, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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the separation device, but on the Constitution’s numerous deviations from the 
pure separation model.52 
Power sharing among the branches is therefore inevitable, as are disputes over 
where the line is between constitutionally appropriate checks and balances and 
the unconstitutional arrogation of one branch’s prerogative by another. 
For decades, we have assumed that the constitutional framework for 
resolving such disputes is provided by Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in 
Youngstown.  For better or worse, though, Jackson’s framework marginalizes 
originalism, suggesting that whatever we might learn by studying “originalist” 
sources will be necessarily incomplete, regardless of the potential utility of 
such knowledge.  Writing a few years ago, Professor Flaherty poignantly 
observed that “Jackson merely assumed history was invariably inconclusive,”53 
without getting into the far more difficult and important work of proving as 
much. 
Although Flaherty himself argues that “a careful reconstruction of the 
Founding era decisions tends to confirm [Jackson’s] assumption,”54 there are 
others who would disagree, and who have suggested, especially as of late, that 
at least some of the great questions concerning the allocation of constitutional 
foreign affairs powers can be answered by reference to originalism.55  The 
point of this response has not been to suggest that I side with one school over 
the other in this debate—even though I do share much of Professor Flaherty’s 
skepticism.  For until and unless the Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers 
jurisprudence begins to more powerfully reflect the idea that some of these 
questions do have categorical answers—a point that is at best implicit in the 
recent Hamdan and Medellin decisions—functionalism will remain the 
methodological watchword, and originalism will remain the fodder for 
interesting (but entirely academic) debates. 
 
 
 52. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 
1531–32 (1991) (footnotes omitted) (quoting GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE 
FEDERALIST 119 (1981)). 
 53. Flaherty, supra note 9, at 172 (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 33, at 53; see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE 
PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (2002) (arguing that there are clear lines of demarcation between the 
President’s foreign affairs powers and Congress’s authority in the field). 
